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SALIX V. USFS; WHY CAN’T THE AGENCIES JUST TALK 




No. 13-35624  
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
 
Oral Argument: Monday, July 7, 2014, 9:00 a.m. in the Portland Pioneer 
Courtroom, Portland, Oregon.  
 
Case Panel: PREGERSON, PAEZ, WATFORD 
 
I. ORAL ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
 
 Given the complexity and breadth of this case, the summary below 
only includes the main oral arguments of Mr. Brabender and Mr. Kenna 
and the key questions of Judges Pregerson, Paez, and W tford.1 
 
A. Federal Defendants-Appellants USFS 
 
 Within seconds after Mr. Brabender began his argument, Judge Paez 
interjected to ask why USFS did not reinitiate consultation when FWS 
designated lynx critical habitat. Mr. Brabender claimed that USFS did 
not take any affirmative action which required consultation because it did 
not promulgate the designation. He then introduced USFS’s main § 7 
argument: in this case, the agency is not required to reinitiate 
consultation on the Amendment because it is sufficient that consultation 
occurs when specific projects are considered. Judge Paez asked if USFS 
refers to the broader Amendment when engaged in project level 
consultation and whether the Amendment would be stronger if it 
included critical habitat. In response, Mr. Brabendr equated the 
Amendment’s identification of occupied habitat with the ESA’s critical 
habitat designation and argued that project consultation would reveal if 
the Amendment’s protections were insufficient. When Judge Paez 
pointed to ESA regulations, which seem to impose an obligation to 
reinitiate consultation in this case, Mr. Brabender claimed the provision 
only applies when an agency action occurs and the continued existence 
of the forest plan is not action.  
 Mr. Brabender then argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing in this 
case because they failed to show any concrete harm. While Judge Paez 
                                         
1 Oral Argument Audiofile, Cottonwood Envtl. Law Ctr. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 
http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/ media/view.php?pk_id=000 013005 (9th Cir. July 7, 2014) (No. 13-
35624). 
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viewed the plaintiffs’ declarations as “pretty carefully drawn,” Judge 
Watford asked if the plaintiffs needed to challenge a particular project to 
establish injury. Mr. Brabender responded affirmatively, and that the 
plaintiffs failed in that respect.  
 
B. Environmental Plaintiff-Appellee CELC  
 
 Mr. Kenna attempted to begin his argument on the merits, but he was 
quickly redirected by Judge Watson’s clear concern with the standing 
issue. He asked why the court shouldn’t require the plaintiffs to establish 
injury stemming from a specific project and how they could be impacted 
absent the approval of a plan’s particular project. First, Mr. Kenna 
responded that the plaintiffs did allege injury from three USFS projects, 
which stemmed from the implementation of the Amendment. Mr. Kenna 
also argued that case law allows plaintiffs to mount a facial challenge to 
a programmatic plan if they demonstrate impacts to them in a specific 
place. Further, he argued that just because a plaintiff can bring a site 
specific challenge, does not mean they cannot challenge the 
programmatic plan instead. Judge Watford asked what injury the 
plaintiffs could have possibly suffered if a consultation was completed 
for a site specific plan. Mr. Kenna countered that site specific 
consultation alone is insufficient, even where cumulative impacts are 
considered.  
 With the prompting of Judge Paez, Mr. Kenna was able to resume 
his arguments on the merits. He cited a litany of case law for the 
proposition that USFS was required to reinitiate consultation on the 
Amendment because the agency retains discretion to protect the lynx 
under the ESA. Judge Watford then prompted Mr. Kenna to make his 
argument for injunctive relief. Mr. Kenna stated that while there was no 
need to show irreparable harm in this case, such harm is presumed from 
USFS’s procedural violation because of the ESA’s clear mandate to 
protect endangered species. Mr. Kenna also claimed that, absent the 
pressure of an injunction, there was no incentive for USFS to reinitiate 
consultation on the Amendment.  
 
C. USFS’s Rebuttal Argument 
 
 Mr. Brabender’s rebuttal argument was significantly frustrated by 
Judge Pregerson’s demands to know why USFS could not just “talk” to 
FWS after a significant change in lynx critical habit t designation. While 
Mr. Brabender claimed that consultation occurs on specific projects, he 
could not say if any occurred in the last year. Judge Pregerson’s 
frustration with Mr. Brabender was evident, accusing him of putting up 
“smokescreens” and failing to “talk straight.” In the last few minutes of 
his time, Mr. Brabender was able to argue against ijunctive relief, 
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stating that the plaintiffs failed to show irreparable harm. However, 
Judge Paez contended that it wouldn’t “take much” for the plaintiffs to 
show such harm when an endangered species is involved.     
 
II.  ANALYSIS 
 
 Toward the end of Mr. Kenna’s argument, Judge Pregerson asked 
him “where the shining path is to help you get where you want to go.” 
This statement seems indicative of the general support for CELC’s 
arguments on the merits, at least by the majority of the court. While Mr. 
Kenna sailed smoothly through his § 7 argument, Judge Paez and Judge 
Pregerson besieged Mr. Brabender with questions and challenges.   
 While CELC’s biggest challenge seems to be Judge Watford’s 
reluctance to accept their standing argument, the plaintiffs will likely 
survive the threshold challenge to standing. Near the end of his long 
exchange with Mr. Kenna on the issue, Judge Watford sai  he was still 
“stuck” on the idea that injury had to stem from a specific project. 
However, neither Judge Paez nor Judge Pregerson seemed to join Judge 
Watford in his concern.  
 The majority of the court also seemed receptive to Mr. Kenna’s 
argument for injunctive relief. While Judge Paez briefly asked about the 
presence of irreparable harm, he focused more on the timber projects 
involved and how the injunction would work overall. Additionally, Judge 
Pregerson seemed convinced that USFS would not act to reinitiate 
consultation without an injunction. Thus, if the plaintiffs win on their 
standing and § 7 arguments, there is a real possibility that an injunction 
will be granted.  
 
Lower Court: District of Montana Cause No. CV 12-45-M-DLC; 
Honorable Dana L. Christensen, District Court Judge of the United State 
District Court, District of Montana. 
 
Attorney for Appellants: John Philip Meyer, Cottonwood Environmental 
Law Center, Bozeman, Montana and Matt Kenna, Durango, Colorado. 
 
Attorneys for Appellees: Allen M. Brabender, Attorney, Department of 
Justice, Washington, DC and Mark Stegar Smith, Assistant U.S. 
Attorney, Billings, Montana.  
